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ABSTRACT
Several scholars and policy-makers have claimed that Europe, and Western
Europe in particular, has managed to ‘decouple’ economic growth from
material use. We identify and address one major limitation in the existing
literature – failure to take the endogeneity of economic growth into
account. Based on a panel data-set of 32 European countries from 2000 to
2014, we estimate the causal impact of gross domestic product (GDP) on
domestic material consumption (DMC) applying an instrumental variable
approach. We use the number of storm occurrences as an instrument for
GDP, which we show is both relevant and valid. Our results provide new
evidence that increasing the GDP growth rate causes the DMC growth
rate to increase for Western Europe, whereas the effect is insigniﬁcant for
the Eastern European economies and Europe as a whole. As our results
partly question current wisdom on the achievements of ‘decoupling’,
especially among European policy-makers, we offer two explanations that
are consistent with these results.
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1. Introduction
There have been extensive discussions among scholars and policy-makers on how economic growth
can be achieved while staying within the planetary boundaries (e.g. Arrow et al. 1995; Rockstr€om
et al. 2009). This has triggered a large literature investigating the effects of economic growth on vari-
ous types of environmental pressures, in particular carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (Selden and
Song 1994; Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judson 1998; Galeotti, Lanza, and Pauli 2006; Vollebergh,
Melenberg, and Dijkgraaf 2009; Wagner 2015).
Interdisciplinary scholars have argued that CO2 emissions and other single indicators of environ-
mental pressures often used in economic studies fail to comprehensively capture (1) the variety of
pressures arising at different stages of contemporary supply chains and (2) pressures that occur with
a delay. These scholars have proposed material ﬂow and footprint indicators as a more comprehen-
sive measure for environmental pressures (Alfsen and Sæbø 1993; Bringezu, Sch€utz, and Moll 2003;
Ibenholt 2003; van der Voet, van Oers, and Moll 2005b; Hertwich 2010; Bleischwitz 2010; Hoang
and Alauddin 2012; Bouwmeester and Oosterhaven 2013; Wiedmann et al. 2006; Teixido-Figueras
and Duro 2015).1 The advantage of considering materials as a proxy for environmental pressures is
that they reﬂect apparent and not ﬁnal consumption (EC 2015a), i.e. the actual use of materials may
take place at a later point in time than indicated by the material indicators. Policy-makers in Europe
and around the world have recently made the reduction of material use a central policy objective,
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with the explicit aim to reduce environmental pressures associated with it (EC 2011; G7 2015; UN
2015; EC 2015b; OECD 2016).
The empirical literature on the relationship between economic growth, measured by gross
domestic product (GDP), and material use predominantly ﬁnd a positive correlation between the
two variables (e.g. Bringezu et al. 2004; van der Voet, van Oers, and Moll 2005b; Wiedmann et al.
2006; Jaunky 2013), but investigations on the shape of the relationship between GDP and material
use produce inconclusive results (H€uttler, Schandl, and Weisz 1999; Bruyn 2002; Canas, Ferr~ao, and
Conceic¸~ao 2003; Bringezu et al. 2004). Studies investigating the drivers of material use, however,
conclude that GDP is an important, if not the most important, determinant (Hoffren, Luukkanen,
and Kaivo-oja 2001; van der Voet, van Oers, and Moll 2005b; Weisz et al. 2006; Steger and Bleisch-
witz 2011; Weinzettel and Kovanda 2011; Pothen and Schymura 2015).
Crucially, some studies claim that most European countries, in particular Western Europe, have
managed to ‘decouple’ economic growth from material use, at least in relative terms (Bringezu and
Sch€utz 2001; Moll, Bringezu, and Sch€utz 2005; van der Voet, van Oers, and Moll 2005b), a belief
which is accepted by policy-makers (Ecorys 2011; OECD 2011; BMUB 2016) and reﬂected in several
policy initiatives, for instance, the Raw Materials Initiative (EC 2008), the Europe 2020 strategy
declaring resource efﬁciency as one of seven ﬂagship initiatives (EC 2010), the Roadmap to a
Resource Efﬁcient Europe (EC 2011), and the Circular Economy Package (EC 2015b). From an eco-
nomics perspective, ‘decoupling’ economic growth from material use is essentially about increasing
the productivity by which materials are transformed into economic goods and services and thus
linked to the total factor productivity of economies (Baptist and Hepburn 2013).
In summary, investigating the effect of economic growth on material use entails (1) a more com-
prehensive investigation on environmental pressures arising from economic activity, (2) an analysis
on the drivers of material use, and (3) a veriﬁcation on the ‘decoupling’ efforts in Europe.
We identify and address one major shortcoming in the literature. Most studies rely on correlation
and simple regression analyses, failing to take the endogeneity of GDP into account, which results in
biased and inconsistent estimates. In this paper, we estimate the causal relationship between GDP
and material use, measured by domestic material consumption (DMC)2 by explicitly acknowledging
that GDP and DMC are simultaneously determined. On the one hand, income drives consumption,
including the consumption of materials (Ando and Modigliani 1963; Hall and Mishkin 1982). On
the other hand, materials are an input into economic production functions (Ayres and van den
Bergh 2005; O’Mahony and Timmer 2009). We address this endogeneity problem, along with the
endogeneity problem caused by omitted variable bias by using an instrumental variable approach.
In our paper, we consider 32 European countries,3 which is a group of industrialised countries
that are bound by similar regulation and use a standardised method to measure DMC. We use
2SLS, including country and time effects, and instrument GDP with the number of storm occur-
rences. This allows us to make causal inference under two conditions. First, storms need to be corre-
lated with GDP, i.e. the instrument needs to be relevant. Second, storms must not impact DMC
other than through GDP, i.e. the instrument needs to comply with the exclusion restriction.
With regard to the ﬁrst point, the literature suggests that severe weather events have an impact on
countries’ current and future GDP, with the majority of the literature suggesting a negative effect
(Cavallo, Powell and Becerra 2010; World Bank and UN 2010; Cavallo et al. 2013; Noy and DuPont
2016). With regard to second point, two potential links between storms and DMC are discussed in
Section 2, i.e. changes in trade, a link which is captured by GDP, and changes in material prices as a
result of a storm. We present empirical evidence that some material prices are affected in the short
term but this effect disappears two years after a storm occurs. As a consequence, we use a temporal
instrumentation strategy to estimate the causal impact of GDP on DMC with the instrument lagged
two years to meet the exclusion restriction.
Our results provide new evidence that increasing the GDP growth rate causes an increase in the
DMC growth rate for Western Europe, whereas the effect is insigniﬁcant for Eastern European econ-
omies, which questions the current wisdom, especially among European policy-makers, that the link
2 P. AGNOLUCCI ET AL.
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between GDP and material use in Western Europe has been broken. Why would Western European
economies demand more materials when their economies expand? We discuss two explanations
that are consistent with these results. Lower energy prices in Western Europe compared to the rest
of Europe increase the demand for materials through its complementarity to energy, and higher
labour cost in Western Europe compared to the rest of Europe could have stimulated substitution
from labour to materials.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the modelling approach,
where we explain our instrumentation strategy in detail. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 out-
lines the results. Section 5 places the results in a wider context and Section 6 concludes.
2. Modelling approach
2.1. The problem of endogeneity
A considerable body of literature investigating drivers of material use and ‘decoupling’ suggests that
GDP affects DMC (van der Voet, van Oers, and Moll 2005b; Weisz et al. 2006; Steger and Bleisch-
witz 2011; Pothen and Schymura 2015). As national income increases, consumption also increases
as proposed by the theoretical work on the Modigliani’s life-cycle hypothesis, which essentially
argues that consumption is a function of income (Ando and Modigliani 1963). Empirical studies
provide evidence for short- and long-term effects of changes in income on consumption (Hall and
Mishkin 1982; Campbell and Mankiw 1989). Although the size of the impact of changes in income
on the use of material depends on the material requirements of economic goods being consumed,
economic activity ultimately leads to an increase in the use of materials as long as economic activity
affects the consumption of economic goods.
Two sources of endogeneity are likely to be present in models investigating the impact of GDP on
DMC – reverse causality and omitted variables. Reverse causality between GDP and DMC arises
since materials are inputs to a country’s production function (Ayres and van den Bergh 2005;
O’Mahony and Timmer 2009). This follows from the basic production process where inputs are
converted into outputs, and materials have also been included as production inputs in recent growth
models (O’Mahony and Timmer 2009). The second source of endogeneity, i.e. omitted variables,
occurs when determinants of the dependent variable which are omitted from the model, e.g. eco-
nomic structure, energy prices, etc., are correlated with GDP. Both sources of endogeneity would
bias OLS estimation.
2.2. Choice of instrument
We choose the number of storms occurred in a country as an instrument for GDP. Natural hazards
have previously been used as instruments for economic variables such as trade, aid inﬂows, and oil
income (Ramsay 2011; Felbermayr and Gr€oschl 2013; Jackson 2014). The main rationale for using
storm occurrences as an instrument is that such events affect GDP in an exogenous manner.
Kahn (2005) ﬁnds that the general level of economic development, institutional quality, and
geography affect the consequences of natural hazards. However, the economy’s sensitiveness to
storm disasters is unlikely to change in a relatively short time period (World Bank and UN 2010).
In addition, we minimise this risk by using the number of storms rather than monetary variables,
e.g. damages caused by storm, as these are more likely to be inﬂuenced by the level of economic
development. Moreover, we eliminate country-speciﬁc trends by taking the ﬁrst difference which
might further reduce the risk of storms being endogenous, as changes in storm occurrences are less
likely to correlate with economic development. Additionally, by taking the ﬁrst difference, we avoid
any standard complication related to spurious regressions.
Storms occur relatively frequently, both across countries and time. Since we estimate a ﬁxed
effects model in ﬁrst differences, we need to consider an instrument that varies over time, a
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consideration that led us to exclude earthquakes, volcanoes, and droughts, which either do not occur
frequently or not at all in several countries. We preferred using storms rather than ﬂoods, since
storms typically affect larger areas. For instance, storms could affect transportation routes and
energy generation as well as supply networks, thus impacting economic activity regardless of its
proximity to economic centres. Areas affected by storms are also more likely to vary across time, as
areas affected by ﬂoods need to be close to rivers or to the sea. Storms have been reported in every
European country except Finland and Serbia, whereas eight European countries have not reported
any ﬂood during the sample period used in this study. In addition, ﬂood defence mechanisms may
reduce the likelihood of re-occurring ﬂoods or their impact on GDP, therefore potentially
compromising the exogeneity of the instrument.
Data on extreme weather events are publically available in the Emergency Events Database EM-
DAT (Guha-Sapir, Below, and Hoyois 2014). EM-DAT contains indicators that measure storms in
different ways.4 Storm occurrences, rather than any of the alternative measures, have the advantage
of being more likely to be a precise, objective, and exogenous measure. However, this comes at the
expense of treating all storms equally, regardless of their impact. Nevertheless, the EM-DAT data-
base only comprises those storms that had a signiﬁcant impact, i.e. 10 or more people reported
killed, 100 or more people reported affected, declaration of a state of emergency, or call for interna-
tional assistance.
We are also mindful that reporting might be heterogeneous across countries, although we believe
that this potential problem has limited relevance in our sample, since most European countries are
industrialised economies with established monitoring authorities and reporting requirements.
Under-reporting is not likely to be an issue as European countries have an incentive to correctly
report disasters, since they become eligible to emergency aids to cope with immediate damages as
well as long-term investments in prevention from the European Union’s Solidarity Fund and the
Civil Protection Mechanism.
2.3. Instrumentation strategy
As already mentioned, instruments need to be relevant and valid. Relevant instruments require a
strong correlation between the instrument and the endogenous variable. The great majority of inves-
tigations embrace the view that disasters are a setback for economic growth due to damages to the
capital stock and additional disruptions of economic activity during their immediate aftermath (e.g.
electricity cuts, obstructing people to work) as well as their subsequent course (e.g. crowding-out
investments, migration, reconstruction delays, welfare transfers) (Hochrainer 2009; Raddatz 2009;
Hsiang and Jina 2014; DuPont et al. 2015).5
This can be exempliﬁed by the extra-tropical cyclone Xynthia which affected France in February
2010. It had severe negative impacts on economic activity, both during the immediate aftermath
and a few years after the disaster.6 However, the reconstruction after the storm can positively con-
tribute to economic growth. Regardless of whether storms have a positive or a negative effect, they
are thought to affect economic activity.
The exclusion restriction requires the instrument to affect the dependent variable (DMC) only
through the endogenous variable which has been instrumented for (GDP). Felbermayr and Gr€oschl
(2013) use natural hazards in neighbouring countries rather than the home country to instrument
for the endogenous regressor in the home country to increase the chances of meeting the exclusion
restriction. However, this spatial differentiation approach is not suitable for our study, since storms
tend to affect several neighbouring countries simultaneously. Instead, we adopt a temporal instru-
mentation strategy that attenuates the potential direct impact of storms on DMC.
One way storms could impact DMC is through trade. If a country is hit by a storm, the national
production capacity is temporarily reduced, which could reduce its exports and increase imports. As
net exports are part of GDP, changes in trade due to storms would affect DMC only through GDP,
which is not a violation of the exclusion restriction. Another way storms could affect DMC is
4 P. AGNOLUCCI ET AL.
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through their impact on material prices. We explore this possibility by assessing the relationship
between storms and prices of the subgroups of DMC (biomass, metals, minerals, and fossil fuels),
since there is no DMC price indicator available across Europe.
Metals and fossil fuels are traded on global markets and local storms are unlikely to affect those
prices. This is particularly likely for our sample since Europe is a small producer of metals and fossil
fuels. As the markets for biomass and minerals are mainly local, we investigate whether storms have
an impact on those prices, as a statistical association would cast doubts on our instrument. We esti-
mate the following models:
Dpi;t ¼ k Dstormsi;th þ ’t þ ui þ yi;t (1)
where ’t are time effects, ui are country ﬁxed effects, stormsi;th indicates the number of storm
occurrences. These are taken from the EM-DAT database unless explicitly stated. The letter h indi-
cates the time lag with h 2 0; 1; 2ð Þ. pi;t indicates the price of biomass, material inputs, and mineral
prices as dependent variables in the three different models we estimate – as shown in Table 1.
To proxy biomass prices, we chose real industrial crop prices in Europe between 2000 and 2014
from Eurostat. As shown in Columns 1–3, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between storms and
crop prices. In the case of material input prices, Columns 4–6, we consider the correlation between
the number of storm occurrences and the material input prices for constructing residential building
from Eurostat in Europe between 2000 and 2014. As shown in Table 1, we ﬁnd no statistically signif-
icant association between storms and material input prices across time. In the case of mineral prices,
Columns 7–9, we use data from the Nordic Statistic Database on the mineral costs of dwelling con-
struction and the number of storms from the Extreme Wind Storms Catalogue for Finland, Sweden
and Denmark from 2000 to 2013. The Nordic countries are the only group of countries that collect
mineral price data using a standardised approach, both in terms of data collection and variable
deﬁnition.
As shown in Table 1, we ﬁnd that the relationship between storms and mineral prices in the cur-
rent period is signiﬁcant at the 10% level and negative. The impact of a storm in the previous period
on mineral prices is positive (possibly due to reconstruction) and is just outside the 10% signiﬁcance
level, but when storms are lagged two years, the statistical association completely disappears. This
brief analysis suggests that the relationship between storms and material prices becomes statistically
insigniﬁcant after two years. In line with our temporal strategy mentioned above, we lag our instru-
ment twice to ensure that our instrument satisﬁes the exclusion restriction so that no impact of
storms affect DMC without going through changes in the level of economic activity.
Table 1. Relationship between the number of storm occurrences and material prices in Europe.
Biomass prices Material input prices Mineral prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dstormsi;t 4.167 0.324 ¡1.568
(3.525) (0.202) (0.818)
Dstormsi;t1 2.718 0.120 1.142
(1.846) (0.254) (0.711)
Dstormsi;t2 2.147 ¡0.091 ¡0.066
(1.402) (0.194) (0.716)
(within) R2 0.12 0.16 0.24 0.39 0.44 0.42 0.78 0.77 0.76
N 129 120 106 178 167 154 45 42 39
Notes: Columns 1–3: dependent variable is Dcrop pricei;t . Within ﬁxed effects estimation including country and year ﬁxed
effects for Europe between 2000 and 2014. SEs are clustered over countries and shown in parentheses. Columns 4–6: depen-
dent variable is Dmaterial input pricesi;t . Within ﬁxed effects estimation including country and year ﬁxed effects for Europe
between 2000 and 2014. SEs are clustered over countries and shown in parentheses. Columns 7–9: dependent variable is
Dmineral pricesi;t . OLS with country and year ﬁxed effects for Finland, Sweden, and Denmark between 2000 and 2013.
Robust SEs are shown in parentheses.
p< 0.10; p < 0.05; p < 0.01.
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2.4. Model speciﬁcation
In our model, DMC in the current period is inﬂuenced by GDP in the previous period. Increasing
material use involves coordination across several stages of the supply chain, as inventories are not
likely to be able to accommodate large demand shifts. Also, the material use of households tend to
respond with a delay to changes in income, e.g. cars and houses are not purchased immediately after
a raise in income (Shapiro and Slemrod 2009; Jappelli and Pistaferri 2010). Hence, we formulate our
model as
DMCi;t ¼ p GDPi;t1 þ gt þ ui þ ei;t (2)
where DMC is the domestic material consumption in tonnes per capita, GDP is the per capita real
gross domestic product in PPP, gt are time effects to control for any year-speciﬁc events, e.g. the
ﬁnancial crisis, ui are country ﬁxed effects, and ei;t is the idiosyncratic error term. Countries are
likely to have a different cultural and historic background, economic development paths, institu-
tional quality, material policies and other country-speciﬁc trends which might inﬂuence the time
pattern of DMC and GDP (Bahn-Walkowiak and Steger 2015). As discussed above, by taking the
ﬁrst differences of Equation (2), country-speciﬁc trends are eliminated, therefore, reducing the risk
of spurious regressions. Thus, our main model is speciﬁed as follows:
DDMCi;t ¼ p0 DGDPi;t1 þ g 0t þ u
0
i þ e
0
i;t (3)
where g
0
t are time effects and u
0
i are country ﬁxed effects. The ﬁrst stage of our model considers the
impact of storm occurrences on GDP. As discussed above, storms are lagged twice in order to com-
ply with the exclusion restriction. The ﬁrst stage of our model is speciﬁed as
DGDPi;t1 ¼ z Dstormsi;t2 þ tt þ hi þ fi;t (4)
where tt are time effects, hi are country ﬁxed effects, stormsi;t2 are the number of storm occur-
rences, and fi;t is the idiosyncratic error term. Equations (3) and (4) are estimated using 2SLS with
standard errors clustered over countries. All data are in natural logarithm.7
3. Data description
Materials, i.e. usable substances obtained or derived from natural resources, consist of biomass, met-
als, minerals, and fossil fuels (EC 2017; OECD 2007). Material ﬂow analysis (MFA) is an established
method to calculate material use indicators (OECD 2008). MFA has been increasingly standardised
over time and adopted by several statistical ofﬁces in industrialised countries, including all European
countries (Hinterberger, Giljum, and Hammer 2003). We use data on DMC in tonnes per capita for
32 European countries between 2000 and 2014, extracted from Eurostat. DMC is the only measure
of material use with publically available data which is directly comparable across our sample (EC
2015a).8 For economic activity, real GDP in Euro (in PPP) per capita is extracted from Eurostat.
Figure 1 displays the observations used in the main model (Equation (3)) of the estimation. West-
ern and Eastern European countries are considered separately because they were exposed to differ-
ent political and economic systems in the recent past.9
As an instrument, we use the number of storm occurrences from the EM-DAT database. This
database, which is maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters at the
Universite Catholique de Louvain in Belgium, contains information on more than 18,000 extreme
weather events and accidents. Data are collected from UN agencies, non-governmental organisa-
tions, insurance companies, and research institutes.
6 P. AGNOLUCCI ET AL.
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Storms are included in the database if at least one of the following criteria applies: (1) 10 or more
people reported killed, (2) 100 or more people reported affected, (iii) declaration of a state of emer-
gency, or (iv) call for international assistance. We complement the existing data by ‘recovering’ sev-
eral observations. If a country in a given year has reported any disasters other than storms, we
assume that no storms occurred in that year. Table A2 shows the main statistics for our dependent
variable (DMC per capita), endogenous variable (GDP per capita), and instrument (number of
storm occurrences) for the observations used in our study.
4. Results
Starting with the ﬁrst stage model (Equation (4)), we estimate the relationship between storms and
GDP. As indicated in Table 2, the results show a negative and statistically signiﬁcant association
between changes in the number of storms and the GDP growth rate for all three groups of countries.
Those results support the literature advocating that disasters have a negative impact on economic activ-
ity (Hochrainer 2009; Raddatz 2009; Hsiang and Jina 2014; DuPont et al. 2015). The impact of changes
in storm occurrences on the GDP growth rate is lower inWestern Europe compared to Eastern Europe,
suggesting that the Western European economies can cope with storms more efﬁciently.
Using the number of storms to instrument GDP appears to be a robust instrumentation strategy. The
Kleibergen–Paap Wald F-statistics for all country groups is well above 10, which is a common rule of
thumb for considering an instrument to be sufﬁciently strong (Angrist and Pischke 2009). The Kleiber-
gen–Paap rk LM test, which assesses whether the equation is identiﬁed, i.e. that the instrument is ‘rele-
vant’, allows us to reject the null hypothesis of the equation being underidentiﬁed for all groups. All test
statistics in the table are robust to heteroscedasticity and arbitrary within-correlation. Additionally, the
conditional likelihood ratio (CLR) test proposed by Moreira (2003) veriﬁes the validity of our
Figure 1. Relationship between Δln GDPi;t1
 
and Δln DMCi;t
 
for Western and Eastern Europe between 2000 and 2014.
Table 2. First stage results for Europe, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe between 2000 and 2014.
Europe Western Europe Eastern Europe
Dln stormsi;t2
  ¡0.014
(0.003)
¡0.011
(0.003)
¡0.018
(0.005)
Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F statistic (weak id) 27.94 20.04 14.71
Kleibergen–Paap rk LM statistic, p-value (under id) 0.0016 0.0113 0.0424
Conditional likelihood ratio test, p-value 0.1717 0.0195 0.7372
Notes: Dependent variable is Dln GDPi;t1
 
. Estimated with 2SLS. Country and year ﬁxed effects are included. SEs are clustered
over countries and shown in parentheses.
p< 0.10; p < 0.05; p < 0.01.
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instrumentation strategy for Western Europe. However, the fact that the null hypothesis of the CLR test
is rejected at the 5% level only for Western Europe somewhat limits the validity of the results for Europe
as a whole and Eastern Europe. Therefore, we interpret the results of these groups as indications.
4.1. OLS results
We now consider our main model (Equation (3)) estimated with OLS. As displayed in Table 3, the
impact of the GDP growth rate on the DMC growth rate is positive for all three groups but insigniﬁcant
for Eastern Europe. This means that we cannot make any strong claims about how the DMC growth
rates changes in Eastern European countries, whereas the GDP growth rate across Europe and Western
Europe has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact on the DMC growth rate. The relatively low
number of observations compared to the panel considered stems from the fact that using variables in
ﬁrst difference requires data for at least two consecutive years across all variables in the model.
4.2. 2SLS results
The results obtained when using 2SLS are slightly different. There is no indication for a signiﬁcant
link between the GDP growth rate and the DMC growth rate for Europe as a whole and Eastern
Europe. However, the results for Western Europe indicate that a 1% increase in the GDP growth
rate causes the DMC growth rate to increase by 2.7%, which is three times as big as the OLS coefﬁ-
cient. Thus, OLS is considerably biased downwards, implying that the omitted variable bias might
dominate over the reverse causality bias, because we expected the effect of DMC on GDP to be posi-
tive, which would have led OLS to be upwards biased. However, the median value of the OLS results
for Western Europe lies within the 95% conﬁdence interval of the 2SLS result.
At ﬁrst sight, the 2SLS results are in disagreement with previous ﬁndings. For instance, investiga-
tions conducted by the G7 concludes that ‘for every 1% increase in GDP, raw material use has risen
by 0.4%’.10 Bringezu et al. (2004) ﬁnd that GDP increases material use11 by approximately 0.6–0.8
tonnes per 1000 USD. Wiedmann et al. (2006) ﬁnd that the elasticity of DMC with respect to GDP
is around 0.15. Interestingly, we ﬁnd somewhat similar magnitudes for Europe and Western Europe
using the OLS model. However, our models are estimated in ﬁrst difference whereas previous results
are based on models in levels, thus a direct comparison is not possible. Other studies have found that
most European countries, in particular Western Europe, supposedly have broken the link between
economic activity and material use, at least in relative terms (Bringezu and Sch€utz 2001; Moll, Bring-
ezu, and Sch€utz 2005; van der Voet, van Oers, and Moll 2005b). Our IV-estimations provide new
evidence casting doubt on such claims, which seem to be acratically accepted by policy-makers
(Ecorys 2011; OECD 2011; BMUB 2016).
4.3. Robustness checks
Table 4 summarises our robustness checks for Europe, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe.
Throughout all checks, our instrumentation remains robust. The time effects are highly signiﬁcant
Table 3. OLS and second stage results for Europe, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe between 2000 and 2014.
Europe Western Europe Eastern Europe
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Dln GDPi;t1
 
0.545 0.986 0.900 2.662 0.298 ¡1.328
(0.238) (0.947) (0.185) (0.919) (0.241) (0.996)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
within R2 0.37 0.36 0.40 0.10 0.28 0.40
N 201 196 123 119 195 77
Notes: Dependent variable is Dln DMCi;t
 
. Estimated with OLS and 2SLS. SEs are clustered over countries and shown in parentheses.
p< 0.10; p < 0.05; p < 0.01.
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and thus included in all estimations. We assessed the impact of excluding the country ﬁxed effects
and discovered that dropping them does not change our results signiﬁcantly.
We also tested our results’ robustness and sensitivity by excluding individual countries and years.
In particular, excluding the years of the ﬁnancial crisis 2008–2010 (Columns 1–3) somewhat reduces
the signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient for Western Europe, but the magnitudes of the coefﬁcients are very
similar. We also estimated our model after excluding the smallest European countries, which have a
population below 1 million, i.e. Malta, Luxembourg, and Cyprus (Columns 4–6). This does not
change our results signiﬁcantly. We further investigated whether the ﬁnancial crisis caused a struc-
tural break in the data but we could not ﬁnd a structural break in 2007 or 2008 based on visual
inspection of pre- and post-crisis trends for each country.
As an additional robustness check, we conducted a grid search approach to test various transfor-
mations of GDP and DMC to see whether any transformation (other than natural logarithms) better
explains the relationship. Considering the residual sum of squares and the value of the coefﬁcients,
results from other transformations of the variables were found to be only marginally different from
the natural logarithm. Furthermore, we analyse the residuals of the estimations for Europe, Western
Europe, and Eastern Europe separately in order to evaluate whether the assumption of a common
relationship between GDP and DMC within these three groups is reasonable. Since there are no
obvious outliers visible in the residuals of the country groups, we are conﬁdent that the assumption
of a common relationship within these groups is justiﬁed.
As part of our robustness checks, we control for three variables that are considered important
drivers of DMC (Schandl and West 2010; Giljum et al. 2012; Steinberger et al. 2013). First, we con-
trol for real per capita labour productivity (Dlnðlabouri;tÞ) retrieved from Eurostat. Labour produc-
tivity has a positive effect on DMC in Europe and Eastern Europe. The impact of the GDP growth
rate on the DMC growth rate becomes negative and signiﬁcant for Eastern Europe, which seems to
be an unreliable and most of all not robust result given the large p-value of the CLR test. Second, we
control for the service sector share of GDP (Dlnðservicei;tÞ) from Eurostat. Although the service sec-
tor is associated with lower material use, it does not appear to have a signiﬁcant impact on DMC.
Third, we control for industrial electricity prices in Euro per kWh including all taxes and levies
retrieved from Eurostat (Dlnðelectricityi;tÞ). We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between electricity
prices and DMC. The results are shown in Table 5. It is worth mentioning that the standard errors
in Columns 4–6 are fairly similar to the ones in Table 3.
We evaluated different types of standard errors, i.e. those assuming homoscedasticity and those
robust to heteroscedasticity, but all give qualitatively the same results. We also consider the possibil-
ity of serial correlation, using the approach suggested by Newey and West (1987) and estimate
Equation (3) controlling for various autocorrelation structures. In Table 6, we show that our results
are essentially unchanged when using AR(1), AR(3), and AR(5) error structures, particularly the
standard errors for Western Europe are fairly similar to the ones in Table 3.
So far, we have tested for weak instruments by showing that the Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F-sta-
tistics is sufﬁciently high and the CLR test produces a low p-value for Western Europe. An
Table 4. Robustness checks for Europe, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe using 2SLS.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Europe Western Europe Eastern Europe Europe Western Europe Eastern Europe
excl. 2008–2010 excl. MT, LU, CY
Dln GDPi;t1
 
1.322 2.801 ¡0.408 0.861 2.368 ¡1.328
(1.062) (1.468) (0.994) (0.972) (1.090) (0.967)
Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald 19.42 18.16 9.51 29.26 21.13 14.71
Kleibergen–Paap rk LM 0.003 0.008 0.038 0.002 0.011 0.042
CLR test 0.388 0.025 0.591 0.304 0.029 0.752
N 132 85 47 190 113 77
Notes: Dependent variable is Dln DMCi;t
 
. Country and year ﬁxed effects are included. SEs clustered over countries are shown
in parentheses. Columns 1–3 exclude 2008–2010. Columns 4–6 exclude Malta, Luxembourg, and Cyprus.
p< 0.10; p < 0.05; p < 0.01.
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alternative approach is to generate random variables, i.e. variables with random values, but with the
same mean and standard deviation as our instrument and use these variables with the same statisti-
cal properties as our instrument to estimate our model by ‘placebo’ 2SLS regressions. If the results
were similar to those displayed in Table 3, our instrument could be questioned (Bound, Jaeger, and
Baker 1995). This approach is chosen over using alternative instruments as a robustness check,
because other measures of storms, including their severity measured by the number of people
affected, are only imprecisely and sparsely reported in the EM-DAT database. We also believe that
the number of storms is more likely to be an exogenous indicator than measures of storms’ severity
which are likely to be affected by the level of economic development.
Therefore, we run 1000 ‘placebo’ 2SLS regressions to estimate our model with random variables
which have the same statistical properties as our ‘real’ instruments. The second stage coefﬁcients p
0
1
are shown in Figure 2 and Table 7 for Europe. The results for Western Europe are shown in
Figure A1 and Table A3 and for Eastern Europe in Figure A2 and Table A4. As expected, the median
and, to a lesser extent, the mean values are similar to the OLS coefﬁcients in Table 3, but they are
imprecisely estimated. In short, our instrument passes the non-robustness test proposed by Bound,
Jaeger, and Baker (1995).
5. Discussion
The results suggest that increasing the GDP growth rate causes an increase in the DMC growth rate
for Western European countries, while there is no indication for an effect on the DMC growth for
Eastern Europe. Therefore, a potential difference between Western and Eastern Europe can be
explored further using statistical methods.
Table 5. Control variables for Europe, Western Europe and Eastern Europe.
Europe Western Europe Eastern Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dln GDPi;t1
 
1.29 1.35 1.19 2.76 2.90 2.88 ¡1.90 ¡2.00 ¡1.68
(0.98) (0.98) (0.94) (0.97) (1.05) (1.39) (0.90) (0.89) (0.66)
Dln labouri;t
 
1.54 1.54 1.51 0.43 0.29 0.08 1.84 1.80 1.86
(0.41) (0.41) (0.45) (0.51) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.54) (0.54)
Dln servicei;t
  ¡0.19 ¡0.19 ¡0.72 ¡1.13 0.16 0.11
(0.22) (0.25) (0.95) (0.83) (0.34) (0.32)
Dln electricityi;t
  ¡0.08 ¡0.16 ¡0.08
(0.07) (0.12) (0.06)
Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald 23.98 25.88 25.88 14.77 16.26 12.74 11.54 14.11 17.77
Kleibergen–Paap rk LM 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.017 0.016 0.027 0.078 0.064 0.045
CLR test 0.155 0.103 0.081 0.025 0.026 0.021 0.898 0.667 0.843
R2 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.52 0.50 0.57
N 185 185 165 119 119 109 66 66 56
Notes: Dependent variable is Dln DMCi;t
 
. Estimated with 2SLS, including country and year ﬁxed effects. SEs clustered over
countries are shown in parentheses.
p< 0.10; p < 0.05; p < 0.01.
Table 6. Results assuming different autocorrelation structures.
Europe Western Europe Eastern Europe
AR(1) AR(3) AR(5) AR(1) AR(3) AR(5) AR(1) AR(3) AR(5)
Dln GDPi;t1
 
0.986 0.986 0.986 (0.990) 2.662 2.662 2.662 ¡1.328 ¡1.328 ¡1.328
(0.950) (0.910) (0.990) (1.267) (1.034) (1.024) (1.695) (1.459) (1.381)
N 201 201 201 123 123 123 78 78 78
Notes: Dependent variable is Dln DMCi;t
 
. 2SLS estimation with country and year ﬁxed effects. Newey–West SEs are shown in
parentheses.
p< 0.10; p < 0.05; p < 0.01.
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This section descriptively explores if substitution and complementarity across input factors are
consistent with the potential difference between the two groups. It has sometimes been claimed that
energy and materials are complements (Nordic Council of Ministers 2001; Hannon 2013), while
labour and materials are substitutes (Bruyn et al. 2009; Allwood et al. 2011; Bleischwitz 2012). In
Table 8, we display energy prices and labour costs in Western and Eastern European countries.
Energy prices are PPP-adjusted and include taxes and levies; the arithmetic average of 21 European
countries12 for the years 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 from International Energy Agency (IEA) is
shown. It is clear that energy prices are lower in the Western Europe compared to Eastern European
countries. Given complementarity between energy and materials, lower energy prices in Western
Europe are consistent with, ceteris paribus, a higher demand for materials in Western Europe.
0
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Figure 2. ‘Pseudo’ 1000 2SLS regressions for Europe: to increase readability we have limited the range between ¡40 and 40,
thereby excluding 29 coefﬁcients.
Table 7. ‘Pseudo’ regression statistics for Europe.
p
0
1 from Equation (3)
Mean 1.09
Std. dev. 112.53
Median 0.34
5th percentile ¡19.37
95th percentile 19.39
Notes: Statistics of 1000 p
0
1 coefﬁcients of ‘pseudo’ 2SLS regressions. Model is from Equation (3).
Table 8. Energy prices and labour costs in Western and Eastern Europe in 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012.
2000 2004 2008 2012
Electricity prices
Industry j in MWh
Western Europe 63.29 77.47 114.91 131.90
Eastern Europe 113.74 135.03 172.07 199.90
Gasoline prices
in litres
Western Europe 1.12 1.18 1.58 2.01
Eastern Europe 2.00 1.96 2.12 2.85
Natural gas prices
Industry j in MWh
Western Europe 17.25 20.73 40.26 46.75
Eastern Europe 27.93 35.67 64.84 76.51
Labour costs
per hour
Western Europe 24.28 21.38 21.03 26.93
Eastern Europe 9.51 8.93 10.39 13.23
Notes: Energy prices and labour costs, PPP-adjusted.
Source: Eurostat, World Bank, IEA.
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Table 8 also compares labour costs in Western and Eastern European countries by using data on
total average hourly labour costs in Euros, i.e. including social security contributions, taxes, and sub-
sidies. The data show the arithmetic means of 28 European countries13 for the years 2000, 2004,
2008, and 2012 (from Eurostat). Labour costs are PPP-adjusted using the price level ratio of PPP
conversion factors from the World Bank. Labour costs in Western Europe are more than double the
costs in Eastern European countries. Thus, given substitutability between labour and materials, the
demand for materials in Western Europe is likely to be higher than demand in Eastern Europe.
6. Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to determine the causal impact of economic growth on material use
in Europe. A number of academic studies have advocated the use of material and footprint indica-
tors, arguing that they better represent environmental pressures compared to single-pressure indica-
tors such as CO2 emissions (Alfsen and Sæbø 1993; Bringezu et al. 2003; Ibenholt 2003; van der
Voet, van Oers, and Moll 2005b; Hertwich 2010; Bleischwitz 2010; Hoang and Alauddin 2012;
Bouwmeester and Oosterhaven 2013; Wiedmann et al. 2006; Teixido-Figueras and Duro 2015). In
addition, a number of recent policy initiatives have adopted material indicators (EC 2008, 2010,
2011). Unfortunately, the empirical literature investigating the link between economic growth and
material use has not convincingly dealt with the endogeneity of GDP, thus making previous esti-
mates biased and inconsistent.
We provide new evidence for a causal and positive impact of the GDP growth rate on the DMC
growth rate for Western European economies, using the number of storm occurrences as an instru-
ment for GDP. OLS, which has been used in the previous literature, underestimates that relation-
ship. In the case of Eastern Europe and Europe as a whole, our work does not provide any evidence
contrary to the general belief that economic growth and material use have been ‘decoupled’.
However, in the case of Western Europe, our results contradict previous studies and the current wis-
dom among policy circles, both suggesting that Western European countries have indeed
‘decoupled’ economic growth from material use. Thus, we present new evidence that the link
between the two variables is likely to exist and to be higher than previously thought.
We offer two potential explanations that are consistent with our ﬁndings. First, energy prices are
lower in Western Europe compared to Eastern European countries, suggesting that material demand
has increased in Western Europe due to the complementary between energy and materials. Second,
we ﬁnd that labour costs in Western Europe are higher compared to Eastern European countries.
This indicates that labour might have been substituted by materials.
Our results are important from a policy perspective since they imply that more effective policy
interventions are necessary to break the link between GDP and DMC, in particular for Western
European economies. As such, our ﬁndings put in question the effectiveness of current policies to
‘decouple’ economic growth and material use. Future research efforts could complement our
approach by more analyses on the relationship between GDP and various material indicators, taking
policies and technology into account, and expanding the scope of the study to the global level. Addi-
tionally, the differences between Western and Eastern European countries could be researched in
greater detail.
Notes
1. Other researchers, however, oppose this view since materials are typically measured in weight and aggregated
across material types, leading to a biased and imprecise measure of speciﬁc environmental pressures (Cleveland
and Ruth 1998; Voet, Oers and Nikolic 2005a). These considerations do not limit the signiﬁcance of our analysis,
because such studies (1) fail to include the temporal effect of material use on the environmental across time, (2)
the composition of material use is unlikely to change substantially across our sample, thus not signiﬁcantly
affecting the results of our model which includes country ﬁxed effects, and (3) are often interested in speciﬁc
environmental pressures, whereas our analysis considers general effects.
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2. DMC measures the total amount of materials directly used within an economy. It comprises biomass, metals,
minerals, and fossil fuels and is deﬁned as the quantity (in terms of weight) of domestically extracted raw materi-
als, plus direct material imports minus direct material exports (EC 2015a).
3. A list of the countries can be found in Table A1.
4. Such measures include total deaths, number of people affected, damages in dollars, and a count variable on the
number of storm occurrences.
5. Some studies ﬁnd a positive relationship between natural hazards and economic activity which is often linked to
reconstruction efforts and the long term (Cavallo et al. 2013; Noy and DuPont 2016).
6. The storm killed 53 people, affected more than 500,000 people nation-wide, and caused more than USD 4.2 bil-
lion worth of damages (EM-DAT database). Approximately half of the damages were insured, the rest had to be
borne privately, suggesting a reduction in long-term consumption of affected households assuming Modigliani’s
life-time consumption smoothing hypothesis. Workers were prevented from going to work, electricity supply
was cut for over a million homes and the train infrastructure was damaged. The storm triggered a major ﬂood in
Charente-Maritime, which had a number of impacts: oyster farms (a major employer in the area) were destroyed,
the tourism sector suffered, and productivity of agricultural land (including wine production) was affected by
salty sea water (Lumbroso and Vinet 2011; Genovese and Przyluski 2013).
7. In the case of the number of storm occurrences, we take the natural logarithm after adding one to avoid missing
values caused by this transformation.
8. Alternative indicators, for instance, Raw Material Consumption, are only available for the EU-aggregate and a
few individual countries for a limited time period and without a standardised calculation method. Similar limita-
tions apply to the indicator Total Material Requirement or comparable material footprint data.
9. An overview of the country groupings is shown in Table A1. There is no universally agreed deﬁnition of Western
Europe. We consider Western Europe to be those countries that neither have been part of the Soviet Union nor
Yugoslavia, as those countries have not been integrated into the free-market economies of the West. Turkey is
considered part of Eastern Europe. Finland, Malta, and Cyprus are considered more closely connected to the
Western European economies, in particular during our sample period, and we acknowledge that Malta and
Cyprus have strong historic links to the United Kingdom.
10. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/06/02_2015-06-08-ANNEX_FINAL_
CLEAN_pdf (last accessed on 28 June 2016).
11. Material use here is measured as Domestic Material Input (DMI) which is equivalent to DMC plus material
exports.
12. Out of the 21 European countries, 15 are Western European (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) and
6 are Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia).
13. All countries in Table A1 are considered with the exception of Norway, Switzerland, Serbia, and Turkey.
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Appendix
Table A1. Countries grouped into ‘Europe’, ‘Western Europe’, and ‘Eastern Europe’.
Europe – 32 countries Western Europe – 19 countries Eastern Europe – 13 countries
Belgium Belgium
Bulgaria Bulgaria
Czech Republic Czech Republic
Denmark Denmark
Germany Germany
Estonia Estonia
Ireland Ireland
Greece Greece
Spain Spain
France France
Croatia Croatia
Italy Italy
Cyprus Cyprus
Latvia Latvia
Lithuania Lithuania
Luxembourg Luxembourg
Hungary Hungary
Malta Malta
Netherlands Netherlands
Austria Austria
Poland Poland
Portugal Portugal
Romania Romania
Slovenia Slovenia
Slovakia Slovakia
Finland Finland
Sweden Sweden
United Kingdom United Kingdom
Norway Norway
Switzerland Switzerland
Serbia Serbia
Turkey Turkey
Table A2. Statistics on DMC per capita, GDP per capita and the number of storm occurrences in Europe, Western Europe and
Eastern Europe between 2000 and 2014.
Group Variables in ﬁrst difference N Mean Median Std. deviation Min Max
Europe DMC per capita 201 ¡0.085 ¡0.098 1.671 ¡5.539 6.853
GDP per capita 201 538.02 657.67 889.39 ¡2,647 2,360
Storms 142 0.014 0 1.017 ¡2 3
Western Europe DMC per capita 123 ¡0.193 ¡0.163 1.383 ¡3.466 6.853
GDP per capita 123 535.13 678.26 982.65 ¡2,647 2,360
Storms 94 0.053 0 1.009 ¡2 3
Eastern Europe DMC per capita 78 0.086 0.250 2.044 ¡5.539 6.400
GDP per capita 78 542.57 645.43 724.34 ¡2,512 2,090
Storms 48 ¡0.063 0 1.040 ¡2 3
Table A3. ‘Pseudo’ regression statistics for Western Europe.
p
0
1 from Equation (3)
Mean 5.19
Std. dev. 101.23
Median 0.97
5th percentile ¡11.55
95th percentile ¡11.56
Notes. Statistics of 1000 p
0
1 coefﬁcients of ‘pseudo’ 2SLS regressions. Model is from Equation (3).
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Table A4. ‘Pseudo’ regression statistics for Eastern Europe.
p
0
1from Equation (3)
Mean 13.86
Std. dev. 251.48
Median 0.47
5th percentile ¡15.23
95th percentile 24.61
Notes. Statistics of 1000 p
0
1 coefﬁcients of ‘pseudo’ 2SLS regressions. Model is from Equation (3).
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Figure A1. ‘Pseudo’ 1000 2SLS regressions for Western Europe: to increase readability, we have limited the range between ¡40
and 40, thereby excluding 11 coefﬁcients.
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Figure A2. ‘Pseudo’ 1000 2SLS regressions for Eastern Europe: to increase readability, we have limited the range between¡40 and
40, thereby excluding 32 coefﬁcients.
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